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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, Japanese investment in automobile manufacturing in
the U.S. has increased dramatically. Following the pioneering investment of
Honda in motorcycle production in 1979 and passenger cars in 1981, Nissan
started building small trucks in 1982 and passenger cars in 1985. Toyota
started a joint-venture operation with GM in California, where they started to
produce cars in 1984. Toyota then launched a large-scale independent
investment in Georgetown, Kentucky in 1986. Mazda is building a large and
highly sophisticated plant in the midst of the Detroit metropolitan area.
Mitsubishi also has started construction of a large plant in Bloomington,
Illinois this year working jointly with Chrysler. Fuji Heavy Industry
(Subaru) and Isuzu are, reportedly, considering a major investment project.
By the time all these investment projects are completed, around the end of
1988, the number of cars produced by Japanese auto makers is estimated to
reach the level of aout 2 million a year. So far, their operations seem to
have been successful. ProGuction performance has beer. gooo, anci industrial
relations have been cooperative and peaceful. Will this successful
performance continue? Will Japanese auto makers take over a major portion of
automobile production in the United States? Or will they face obstacles or
serious challenges in the long-run? If so, what will the problems be?
In the face of the large and growing presence of Japanese operations in
the United States, has the interest of American automakers in Japanese
production methods intensified? What can American producers learn from the
Japanese which could improve their own competitive position? Efforts are
being made to learn from Japanese experience both directly and indirectly
through joint-ventures, exchange of information and other means. Will
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American corporations learn something from these efforts? And if they do,
which lessons will be most useful for their purposes?
These are some of the intriguing questions which motivated this study. In
what follows, I will first present in Section II a model of what I perceive to
be the key elements of the Japanese production system. There, special
attention will be paid to a critical dimension of technology -- the linkage
between the technological linkage between the production system and human
resources, which I call "humanware." Then, in Section III, the experience of
Japanese plants in tne U.S. will be reviewed, being summarized in four major
aspects: hardware technology and the proauction system, recruitment and
training, work organization and its functions, and industrial relations.
Finally, in Section IV, I will discuss some of the implication for the future
development of Japanese investments and mutual learning possibilities.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I -
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II. JAPANESE MODEL OF PRODUCTION SYSTEM: HUMANWARE TECHNOLOGY
When you walk into Japanese plants operating in the United States, you may
get several impressions. They look somewhat compact relative to American
assembly plants producing a comparable quantity of cars. They have a stanping
section combined with the assembly facility. However, other than that, they
have essentially the same appearance as typical American auto plants. They
employ basically the same production structure, the same kind of machines, and
the same kind of work arrangements. American employees of Japanese plants
work comparable hours at comparable wages with their counterparts in American
plants.
However, the performance of Japanese plants has been so far much higher
than many of their American counterparts. The quality of their cars has been
graded among the highest of those being sold in this country. Cost of
production is considerably lower, and productivity is higher than comparable
American plants. They have so far enjoyed peaceful and productive
labor-management relations.
What makes this difference? What are the gimmicks? Their haroware
technology for car manufacturing is basically similar to American auto
plants. Indeed, the degree of sophistication in terms of, say, automation is
even lower than some of the newly equipped American plants. Outside observers
are therefore often tempted to conclude that the gimmick lies in "social
organization." Japanese managers' emphasis on team spirit, mutual trust, and
participation, in public remarks seems to be supportive of this thesis. Not
surprisingly, the social organizational side receives much attention in recent
innovative efforts to improve the performance of American plants. Managements
and union officials in some plants are eager to foster teams in work
organization and develop participatory or involvement programs.
II __
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"Humanware"
In the author's judgment, however, the matter of central importance -lies
neither in hardware or social organization-alone. The essence exists in the
combination or in the intersection of the two. Let us name this "humanware."
By "humanware," we mean a self-generating innovative interplay between human
resources and hardware technology. In fact, the hardware cannot work by
itself without human actions. If we may define technology as a way to produce
outputs, hardware technology is in effect only a subset of technology.
Technology becomes a meaningful concept only after the role of human
resources, interlocking and interacting with hardware, is clarified. What we
mean by "humanware" is this broader and more meaningful sense of technology.
And it is our view that the answer to the questions we ponder lies in the
domain of "humanware," rather than in hardware technology or social
organization alone.
Let us now explain this point more in detail in the case of the automobile
industry, resorting to a simple diagrammatic exposition of logical
relationships (Figure 1) in the Japanese production system.
In the diagram, we can read the logical sequence from left to right.
Located at the extreme left are the goals of corporations, which are followed
sequentially by necessary steps to be taken to achieve the goals. The diagram
identifies five stages in this logical sequence. They are: corporate goals,
system outcomes, key features of production system, and major requirements for
human resource effectiveness.
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(1) Corporate Goals
Long-term corporate goals for Japanese automobile manufacturing
corporations may reasonably be said to be corporate growth and profits. In
order to achieve these goals, it is imperative for them to win market
competition. The two major requirements for winning competition are to
provide cars with high quality and at low prices. These define the targets
for the next logical step.
(2) System Outcomes
The production system must produce outcomes that directly realize these
targets. The Japanese production system accomplishes this by yielding through
its operation three important outcomes: low inventory cost, low labor cost,
and low defects. It is self-explanatory that once the system produces these
outcomes, the targets of low price and high quality are satisfied. Note that
low labor cost is not in terms of wage rate per worker but rather fewer head
counts to produce a given output.
(3) Key Features of the Production System2
There are three outstanding features in the Japanese production system,
which are notable when the system is viewed as "humanware." They are:
just-in-time production system (JIT), continuous adjustment of labor input,
and human control of production processes and defects. AS seen in Figure 1,
these elements operate together to achieve low inventory cost, low labor cost,
and low defects or high quality.
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JIT Production System
The first element, JIT (just-in-time) production system, needs some
explanation. We mean a well-organized production system made up of a
combination of some unique sub-systems of production management, which
altogether operate to provide just-in-time flows of goods. Let us underline
here three critical sub-systems: small lot production, even flow production,
and low buffer stock.
Small Lot, Even Flow and Low Buffer
Small lot production is instrumnental in avoiding large in-process
inventories, and is highly useful in minimizing defects in the process because
quick and effective eedback can prevent defects or problems from
proliferating. Once the level of defects is minimizeG and consequently a high
level of certainty in production is attained, then production with even-flow
and low buffer stock can be effectively realized. Even flow of production
helps tremendously in minimizing in-process inventories. The low buffer stock
system can work only when defects of materials are negligibly low, and
precisely because of this, efforts to reduce defects in the process are
strengthened.
These subsystems are, thus, mutually interdependent and also mutually
reinforcing. They work jointly to yield low defects and low inventory, or in
other terms, high quality and low cost. If this interdependence is broken at
any point, the entire system will cease to operate effectively and will lose
its efficiency. In other words, the system is potentially quite vulnerable
because it is critically dependent upon human efforts for realizing and
maintaining its effectiveness.
11__1_____1 _
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Continuous Adjustment of Labor
The second element, continous adjustment of labor, refers to the
continuous effort on the part of workers to reorganize labor input as needed
to keep it proportional to changing production requirements. This effort
naturally leads to, among other things, low labor cost.
Human Control
The third element, human control of production means that human control is
utilized effectively to attain low defect or high quality production. Line
workers are given the discretion to stop the line, if necessary, to remedy
quality problems. Also, quality is carefully and constantly monitored and
inspected by all the workers in the production process. Prevention of defects
is accomplished not only with human eyes and hands. Machines and production
systems are equipped with automatic defect prevention functions, wherever
possible, by modifying or renovating them for the purpose of automatically
avoiding problems and defects. However, here again, improvements through the
experience of workers are the major input in this process. human control of
production, in this way, contributes importantly to attaining not only low
defects, but also low inventory and low labor cost.
(4) Key Areas of Human Resource Involvement
As mentioned earlier, the unique features of the Japanese production
system depend sensitively and critically on the role of human resources. Let
us describe here three notable examples of ways human resources are integrated
into the production system and play critical roles. They are: reduction of
set-up time, self-management of work standards, and self-inspection.
j ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~---
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Reduced Set-Up Time
Reduced set-up time for machine operation is an integral requirement for
small lot production. Japanese auto companies have spent 10 to 20 years
reducing set-up time, for example, of press machines in stamping operation
from several hours to a few minutes. This process of improvement, which
provides enormous cost savings and quality improvements, has not involved
major hardware technological innovations. What was involved was a major
breakthrough in the concept of production management and incremental
improvements in operation promoted largely by daily efforts of line workers
and engineers through their learning by experience.
Self-Management of Work Methods
Self-management of work methods contributes significantly, as shown in the
diagram, to improving the operation of the JIT system, carrying out continuous
adjustment of labor input, ano realizing effective humran control of defects.
Toyota's practice of Hyojunka is a well-known example of this practice, where
line workers are encouraged to study and write up the standardized work steps
or procedures. This is a powerful device that involves workers actively and
deeply not only in operational but also planning or managerial aspects of
production. Although specific methods of worker involvement in production
management utilized by companies vary, this participatory nature of production
management is emphasized by all the Japanese companies.
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Self-Inspection
Self-inspection is an integral element of human control for the purpose of
minimizing defects in the process. Instead of leaving the job of inspecting
quality to the specialized inspectors at the end of the production line, all
the workers on the line are required to check for defects in the outputs they
are producing. This active and constant-participation of line workers, side
by side with engineers, in inspecting outputs at all stages of production is
the key to achieving the high quality cars for which Japanese auto makers are
known.
(5) Human Resource Effectiveness
A review of key features of production systems and human resource
involvement so far would reveal that the effective functioning of the whole
system depends critically on effectiveness of human resources in the
production process. If human resources fail to play effective roles in the
system, the entire system will not operate properly and will lose its
efficiency.
For human resources to occupy such a critical role in the production
process, they must have certain desired attributes. Those attributes may be
classified into three essential dimensions; skill, motivation, and
adaptability. These are critically interdependent; the absence of any one of
them will jeopardize human resource effectiveness.

Skill, Motivation and Adaptability
Skill is critical, but if skilled workers lack motivation they are not
useful. And, even if skilled workers are motivated, if they are not adaptable
to changes in technology or production structure they are not effective.
To equip human resources with these desired traits in the desired balance,
the Japanese system of production is supported closely by well-organized human
resource management and industrial relations policies. Figure 2 describes
schematically the network of these supportive systems.
The human resource management and industrial relations policies that
develop these three essential traits of human resource effectiveness may be
classified into four areas: training, job structure, reward systems, and
participatory policies.
Training
In the area of training, Japanese companies conduct intensive in-house
training both in the areas of on-the-job ana off-the-job training and promote
constantly the development of a multi-skilled workforce through the use of
scheduled rotation and transfer policies, among other measures.
Job Structure
In the area of job structure, broad job classifications are emphasized to
create more versatility in job assignment and flexibility in work
organization. Each job is expanded to include multiple tasks, the promotion
ladder extends for a long span to reach higher supervisory positions, and
transfers are utilized extensively in order to facilitate adjustment to
product changes and demand shifts and to foster a skilled workforce.
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Reward System
The reward system is rather complex. Monthly wages are determined both by
personal traits such as educational attainment and length of service, and by
the skill level associated with the assigned job. In some cases, production
performance is reflected also into monthly pay. Bonuses, however, reflect
more sensitively corporate, group and individual performance. Side by side
with these short-term pecuniary gains is promotion, a no less important
element of reward for both workers and managers. Promotion decisions are made
on the basis of caretul monitoring and evaluation of individual performance.
As a result, the mode of promotional decisions for manual workers at the
workshop is not essentially different from that for managerial workers.
Participation and Communication
Participatory practices are viewed, both by management and union, as
integral elements of the Japanese model of industrial relations. Among other
things, communication, information sharing, and active participation of the
union on managerial matters of production are strongly emphasized. Side by
side with formal collective bargaining, a number of policies and
organizational devices are mobilized to pursue these goals. They include: a
joint consultation system; various functional committees where the union is
represented together with management; meetings, both frmal and informal,
regular and irregular; small group activities; and various forms of joint
problem-solving practices. The union plays an integral role in promoting ant
sometimes administering these policies and practices.
_w- ~ _
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Indispensable Role of the Union
All the major Japanese auto companies are unionized. In fact, the union
is an indispensable cornerstone that supports and promotes the Japanese
production system. This is particularly true because the motivational aspect
of human resource effectiveness, which determines the performance of the
entire system, hinges critically upon the attitude of the union. Motivation
is not something that the management can impose on workers unilaterally. It
comes from the worker's own initiative and his own perception and
understanding of the circumstances. How the union acts and reacts to
different situations, therefore, can affect critically the formation of the
workers' recognition of the given circumstances and also the determination of
their own attitudes. Given the sensitive dependence on human resource
effectiveness of the Japanese production system, the union may be said to hold
a critical key in determining the success or failure of the Japanese
production system.
Fragility of the Humanware System
The heavy reliance of the Japanese production system on hunan resource
effectiveness is and has been its strength, but at the sane time it could be
its vulnerability as well. The system, which is so sensitively and critically
dependent on human resources, could be jeopardized and lose its efficiency if
human resource effectiveness were to be reduced or disrupted for some reason.
This is because the technological interdependence between the production
system and human resources is so essential to the system that it cannot
operate properly without effective linkage between the two.
**IIILlI -UP-- ·I.I-· II -·lllll·P---·llll·--r·l-
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Japanese managers often stress the importance of the human side in
management. They preach the importance of mutual trust, mutual help, respect
to human dignity, team work, participation, etc. They do so not because they
are more humanistic than others; not because their cultural values oblige
them. Rather, they do so because the entire production system is so
completely dependent upon the effective working and involvement of human
resources. To put it differently, they do so because their very survival
depends upon the human resource effectiveness for this technological reason of
"humanware" linkage.
Robustness of the American Production System
In contrast, the conventional American production system is designed to be
robust with regard to problems in human resources. Pursuit of economy of
scale with sufficient amount of buffer stocks has been the dominant mode of
management for the major American autor~mobile corporations. While the American
system is certainly also dependent on human resource effectiveness, it would
not be jeopardized as seriously as the Japanese system by deficiencies
associated with human resources, or by defects in intermediate inputs. This
is because the system can always resort to buffer stocks to draw a sufficient
supply of acceptable inputs. Inventory may be costly. However, this
costliness may well be offset by the low unit cost mace possible by the
economies of scale of large volume production.
Historical Development
The question before us then is why dia Japanese auto rilakers develop such a
fragile and potentially vulnerable system, which depenus so much on the
 __I__
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volatile effectiveness of human resources? What needs were they trying to
meet? To understand these questions, there are several historical background
factors to which we must pay attention.
Productivity Inferiority
A large productivity gap existed between Japanese auto companies and the
American "Big Three" in the early stages of development of the apanese
industry. This gap was so large that it could not possibly have been narrowed
by Japanese refinement of American production methods. Moreover, the American
industry had a definite advantage over the Japanese industry because it could
exploit economies of scale while supplying its large domestic market, in
addition to its already much higher level of technology. While Japanese auto
makers relied greatly on the American pattern of technology up to the early
postwar period, some companies gradually diverted from it and developed their
own unique production systems, concentrating on savinS costs by eliminating
redundancies.3 The leading and most notable example of this innovation took
place at Toyota Motor Company, led chiefly by an ingenious engineer, fir.
Tai-ichi Ohno. Ohno focused on developing a production system which allowed
inventories to be reduced to an uncomparably low level relative to its
American counterparts, thereby gaining a competitive cost advantage. The
model of the Japanese production system, as describec earlier, emergea
gradually through the accumulation of painstaking efforts by Toyota and other
companies that followed its lead. The system, which exploits the virtues of
small lot and low buffer stock production to achieve low costs and defects,
necessarily had to rely heavily on human resource effectiveness, as discussed
earlier.
_______a____·_1_1_1__l________i_____
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Quality Control Problems
Another disadvantage from which the Japanese auto industry, as well as
other Japanese manufacturing industries, suffered in the early stages of
postwar development was the low and unreliable state of quality control.
Since that time, Japanese industries have made strenuous efforts to improve
quality control relying heavily on the guidance and advice of American
experts.4 However, the methodology that they developed differed
considerably from the typical American approach. The most notable difference
is that Japanese companies involve line workers in the systematic program of
quality control, whereas American companies tend to resort to experts. This
difference may have emerged because of the relative absence of a necessary
stock of expertise in the Japanese industrial sector.
Total Quality Control
Whatever the reason, this unique development of quality control methods
has provided some significant advantages to Japanese production systems. One
is that quality control has been built-in more deeply and thoroughly in the
production process itself, and integrated into the jobs of workers, instead of
being left to experts. The other is that the concept of quality control grew
and expanded beyond the realm of the manufacturing process to entire fields of
corporate activities, encompassing product design to sales.5 The
significant implication of this development is that the Japanese system of
quality control has evolved, here again, relying heavily upon active
participation and involvement of the majority of workers.
-16-
Historical Transformation of Industrial Relations
The development of the Japanese production system, which evolved and grew
out of a set of certain economic and technological restraints, has thus come
to rely critically upon human resource effectiveness. This process of
development had significant implications for Japanese industrial relations.
To assure the survival and continuous improvement of their production systems,
Japanese corporations have had to secure full support and cooperation from
their unions. In fact, when the apanese production system was in the early
stage of development, many companies encountered and suffered from difficult
conflicts in industrial relations. Some of the labor disputes threatened the
survival of the companies. This labor turmoil was not only limited to the
automobile industry. Many basic industries, such as iron and steel,
ship-building, electric appliances, etc. met similar problems. However, after
the mid-1960s, industrial relations in Japanese basic industries began to be
transformed from a confrontational mode to a cooperative mode.6 In this
mode of cooperative industrial relations, Japanese unions have played an
integral role in running the Japanese production system as an indispensable
partner to management, up to the present ay
Unique Social Infrastructure
The "humanware" of the Japanese production system htas also taken aavantage
of some other infrastructural factors of Japanese society ano econonty. For
instance, the well-structured public education system and the well-disciplined
and relatively homogeneous labor force fostered throubh the education system
may have helped Japanese companies develop a production system which relies
heavily on the effective contribution of workers. The existence of a highly
I - ··- -- " 0 1 - - ---- ·-----------------------I
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group-oriented network of multi-tier suppliers, which grew out of the
traditional Japanese industrial conmmunity of small firms, has certainly been
helpful for Japanese auto companies in developing their extended just-in-time
production management system which encompasses supplier relations.
"Humanware" technology in the Japanese auto industry has developed into a
total entity of multi-dimensional complexity.
It is extremely interesting to ask whether or not this "humanware" system
of production can be transferred into full-scale industrial operations on
American soil, and how such a transfer will take place. The next section will
introduce some of the recent experiences of Japanese investments in the United
States in order to get some insights to this question.
III. JAPANESE INVESTMENT -- ACTUAL EXPERIENCE
Let us now summarize the actual experience of investments by Japanese
companies in the United States for the following four major aspects: hardware
technology and production system, recruitment ana training, organization, and
industrial relations.7
(1) Hardware technology and production system
Quick Feedback for Quality Assurance
Japanese plants in the United States appear to have several conspicuous
technological features.
All of the four plants constructed so far contain a stamping section
connected with the assembly facilities, unlike American plants. The basic
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reasoning for keeping stamping together with assembly is to allow quick and
effective feedback from the assembly to stamping in order to minimize defects.
Minimum Inventory
Another visible feature is the compactness of the plant. One Japanese
company, which took over an existing but unused American plant, partially
redesigned the production lines and uses only a small percentage of the total
plant space, yet produces a quantity of cars comparable with the old
plant.8 Within this reduced space, they even included a stamping operation
which had not existed in the old plant. Another company produces 300,000 cars
a year using a space of 1.7 million square feet, which is extremely narrow for
its productive capacity. Still another company built a plant almost identical
to its mother plant in Japan, which was designed very compactly to use the
space efficiently. Although the spacial design of the plant is not the sole
determining factor, the compactness of Japanese plants reflects the
extraordinary commitment of Japanese management to minimizing in-process
inventory costs.
Pull System
The "pull" system as opposed to "push" system is a feature of Japanese
plants not so visible to the outside observer. Toyota's "anban" systerm is a
well-known example of this system. While different corpanies use ifferent
names to identify this system, Japanese companies share more or less the
identical concept and apply similar procedures to realize the pull system of
information flow. Combined with the "just-in-time" flows of goods, the pull
system can operate effectively in minimizing inventories and therefore save
___I 1 __1___11___111____1I_---- _
-19-
the costs of production. The extent to which Japanese plants operating in the
U.S. utilize this system varies, however. The major reason for this variance
is the suitability of supplier network available for each OEM. Some companies
still import a large proportion of parts from Japan. Many other parts come
from remote domestic American suppliers. Under these circumstances, the pull
and JIT systems may not necessarily operate effectively. Although the degree
to which the pull system is utilized, and the specific methods used to realize
it, differs among different plants, it is nevertheless clear that all the
Japanese companies in the U.S. stress strongly minimization of inventory costs
by using these systems as much as possible.
Human Control
Reliance on human control is another highly important, "invisible"
element. Although much of the physical production equipment installed in
Japanese plants is not state-of-the-art technology, it is utilizeu in very
efficient and innovative ways. One such example is the short set-up time for
machines. For instance, die change time for press macines for the Japanese
plants in the U.S. currently ranges between 9 to 15 minutes. The short die
change time enables, as discussed earlier, small lot production, low inventory
and low defects. Shortening of die change time has been promoted largely by
workers' learning and improvement efforts on the job. The effort of improving
the performance or capability of machines is often referred to in Japanese
plants as "giving wisdom to machines," which represents innovative interaction
between hardware and human control, the key feature of the Japanese production
system.
n___________ _l~l ___- - -
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Production and work systems are designed in such a way that intermediate
products are inspected carefully at each production station by line workers.
Consequently, a workforce specialized in inspections occupies much less a
proportion of the total employees in Japanese plants than comparable American
assembly plants. Line workers in Japanese plants are given the discretion to
stop the line when they feel it is necessary. They are entitled to do so in
order to solve production problems as quickly as possible, working with
engineers and other support staff, and to minimize the accumulation of
defective products.
In summary, Japanese plants operating in the U.S. have been attempting to
replicate almost exactly the hardware technology and production systems of
their home country. In fact, most major production equipment and machines
have been so far brought into the U.S. from Japan and installed and adjusted
under the careful guidance and supervision of Japanese engineers. Plant
layout and design have been also conducted mostly by apanese engineers.
Similar attempts have also been made in introducing production and work
systems, which are an integral aspect of technology in a broad sense.
However, the task here is much more complex and persistent. This is because
the Japanese production system is designed to promote constantly innovative
interactions between human resources and hardware. As such, a complete
transfer or reproduction of the system is not an easy task. Although the
system has reached the point where routine production operations are performed
quite satisfactorily by American workers and managers, Japanese plant
managers, even after several years of successful performance, are still not
confident about the transfer of autonomous innovative capacity of the system.
_III_ _I_------LI·--LI_--
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(2) Recruitment and Training
Recruitment
Japanese plants in the U.S. place a strong emphasis on recruitmelt ana
make enormous efforts to select the desired type of workforce, although the
specific mode of recruitment varies among different companies.
One company started operation by recruiting relatively small number of
workers from the rural and largely agrarian local labor market in which it is
located, and added more workers as it grew. Most of the recruited are young
workers with high school education. Some of them had manufacturing experience
but virtually none had experience in automobile manufacturing. Another plant
selected some 2,000 workers in a rural local labor market in a southern state
from the list of some 20,000 applications, through several stages of
screening. One joint-venture plant recruited largely from the pool of
laid-off experienced workers. Still another plant started to recruit some
3,000 workers in several stages from the local labor arket which had a high
concentration of automobile industry.
A crucial denominator which characterizes the nature of selection and
recruitment process of all the Japanese plants operating in the U.S. is that
they emphasize equally the worker's attitude toward team work as the most
important criterion. Workers' perceptions and reactions toward team work or
working together are examined closely during interviews at different stages of
the screening process. Another remarkable feature commonly seen is the
careful and intensive nature of screening. Employee selection occurs in
several stages: examination of application forms, orientation sessions, group
discussions, vocational training sessions, various tests at assessment
centers, interviews, and often the process takes a few weeks to a few months.
All this is for manual workers, and not for managers.
__Bn_________·I___l__bl__llll___
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Training
Training is another factor which Japanese plants in the U.S. emphasize
greatly. Training provided to workers is an intensive and long-lasting
process. Training is given in several forms: preliminary vocational
training, orientation sessions, introduction to Japanese mother plants,
on-the-job and off-the-job training.
One company asks inexperienced workers to go through preliminary
vocational training as a prerequisite for employment. Orientation is
emphasized because the Japanese companies want all the employees to understand
the basic concepts along which their production activities are organizei.
Initial orientation for American workers takes several days to a few weeks. A
good proportion of employees including non-supervisory workers, say 10 to 15
percent, are given opportunities to visit mother plants and other facilities
of Japanese corporations. The period of visit for eaci worker varies from a
few to several weeks, and supervisory workers are given such opportunities up
to several times depending upon their needs for training. During their
visits, American workers learn Japanese methods of production operation by
observing and working together with their counterparts in the mother plants.
In the initial few years of plant operations, Japanese skilled workers and
engineers are stationed in plants in the U.S. to teach and consult with
American workers on the job. This is perhaps the most critical part of the
entire training activities. One company still leaves a sizeable number of
staff engineers for this purpose even after several years of successful
operation. In addition, most companies provide off-the-job training programs
at relevant stages for those who need or wish to attend such sessions.
jpl
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Training and learning on the job sometimes relates to promotion. One
company, which started from a relatively small size operation, has been able
to promote young inexperienced workers even as high as managers of production
departments within several years. This kind of promotional opportunity tied
with learning experience on the job seems to stimulate the motivation of the
employees. However, plants which start with large-scale production from the
very beginning and have a relatively experienced workforce normally cannot
provide as many promotion opportunities to all the workers. In those plants,
while training is provided intensively and workers are deeply involved, there
appears to be less concern with promotion.
Extraordinary Emphasis on Human Resources
The extraordinary emphasis placed by the Japanese plants in the U.S. on
the selection and training of workers appears to be inevitable and
imperative. The most obvious reason is that Japanese plants in the U.S. are
carrying out a major technological transfer process. This requires that
Japanese companies spend voluminous resources in educating and training
American workers and middle managers to mold them to the Japanese system of
production. however, the more substantial reason is te criticality of human
resources in the Japanese production system discussed above. Since their
entire production system depends so critically on human resource
effectiveness, unlike the conventional production systems of American
companies, Japanese companies need to be almost abnormally sensitive to
personality, preparedness, attitude, and participation by workers. To put it
strongly, the selection and training of workers are questions of survival for
Japanese companies, for essentially technological reasons. Finally, the
perceived heterogeneity of the American workforce appears to intensify
Japanese companies' education and training activity. The Japanese production
system has operated successfully in Japan with a relatively homogeneous labor
force in terms of preparedness and motivation. To attain a comparable result
working with a heterogeneous workforce may oblige Japanese companies to devote
even greater resources to training and education than they do in their home
country.
(3) Work Organization and Its Functions
There are some notable features in the area of work organization which are
found commonly among Japanese plants in the United States.
Broad Job Class
First is the job structure. All the companies which have started
operation here in the U.S. emphasize a sinyle broad job classification for
production workers. While they do establish a few special skilled job classes
as well, the overwhelming majority of workers are classified in the same
single job class. In a unionized plant, the scheme of job classification and
accompanying working conditions are prescribed clearly in the collective
agreement.
There are at least two major reasons why Japanese companies have insisted
on a single broad job class. One is somewhat cultural and the other is
essentially technological. The cultural reason is that Japanese companies
have been emphasizing consistently in the postwar period a classless corporate
community, where every employee is treated presumably on an equal basis and no
class-related status differentiation is tolerated. I sharp contrast to their
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labor practices in the prewar period, Japanese corporation after the war
abolished, due largely to union pressures for "democratization,"
intra-organizational status discrimination between managerial, supervisory and
production employees in such aspects as the pay system, fringe benefits,
uniforms, dining rooms and access to other corporate facilities. Japanese
companies now regard this classless organization as a highly important factor
in promoting a feeling of loyalty, belonging, togetherness, commitment, ano
other motivational aspects in employees. For this reason, Japanese conpanies
did not want to accept conventional American practices of distinguishing
formally between salary and wage earners, exempt and non-exempt employees, and
different skill classes. In fact, all Japanese companies try to emphasize the
uniformity or equality of most employees by calling them by the same title,
such as "associates," "technicians," or "team members."
However, the more important and substantial reason is technological. One
broad job class was proposed in order to make all the workers in this broad
category prepared to accept whichever job assignments were needed to respond
to and meet the technological needs of production management. In other words,
the underlying intention is to take full advantage of versatility of job
assignments that the broad job classification could provide. in fact, some
American plants are also attempting to promote a shift to fewer job
classifications for the same reason. This versatility ana flexibility of
workforce allocation to variable job structures is regarded as a key element
in achieving the high productivity of Japanese work organizations.
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Reward System
The reward system is closely related to the scheme of job classification.
The single job classification basically means that the same single wage rate
is given to all the workers in the same category. One non-unionized company
applies this rule of remuneration, and the other non-unionized company
provides a fairly elaborate scheme of pay increments up to a certain stage of
worker maturity, and then reverts to the single wage rate for all full-fledged
workers within the job class.
This pay scheme of single wage rate differs fundamentally from the widely
prevalent wage system of Japanese auto companies in Japan. There, a worker's
take-home pay consists of two or three major components: one based on the
worker's personal traits such as education and length of service, and others
on specific jobs. The system is designed so that individual workers receive
different wage rates following this pay scheme, nd ejoy regular wage
increments as they accumulate length of service. Also their performance is
sensitively reflected in tle broad array of rewards, including not only
monthly wages but also bonuses and promotions.
These facts appear to imply that Japanese companies, when they were
planning to start operations in the United States, were obliged to follow the
more-or-less prevalent labor practices in the American labor market. Perhaps,
the most important of them is the practice of pay. The Japanese companies'
stronghold was the single broad job class, and in return they had to adopt an
accompanying single common wage rate, which is quite alien to conventional
Japanese practice.
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Team
All the Japanese companies in the U.S. emphasize the team concept. Each
team has several to a dozen members who work closely together under team
leaders. Several teams are bundled together into a group which is lea by a
group leader or coordinator, whose status is comparable to that of a foreman
in a conventional American plant.
The concept of team is not unique to Japanese plants. In fact, the team
concept has perhaps existed longer in the U.S. than in apan. In the last
decade, there have been several notable attempts in American auto plants to
introduce operating teams into the workshop.9 In contrast, Japanese
companies have never really referred to their work organizations in Japan
specifically as "teams," although they constantly emphasized working together
and helping within work groups. They began to use the term "team" explicitly
after they started major operations in the U.S.
The Japanese concept of team seems to differ from the American use of the
term in some respects. The American concept of team appears to connote an
autonomous, self-managing work unit, while the Japanese team has much less of
this kind of implication. Instead, the Japanese concept of team emphasizes
togetherness, mutual help, and information sharing within the team, and this
team concept sometimes is extended to include outside suppliers.
In fact, the empnasis of mutual help and support extends much beyona the
realm of individual teams to include the entire plant and corporate
organization. The work organization and its functions are designed in such a
way that team members, team leaders, and group leaders are supposed to receive
full support from relevant functionaries or sub-organizations of the plant.
They receive assistance on production and other administrative matters not
-- --L--- 
only from immediate supervisors but also from managers and assistant managers
of their respective departments, on personnel issues from personnel officers,
on technical issues from line and staff engineers. Constant and intensive
support from engineers to workers is particularly emphasized by Japanese
managements. Team leaders play an integral, pivotal function in this
process. The role of the first-line supervisor, which is normally assumed by
a group leader or coordinator, differs somewhat from that of foreman in a
conventional American plant. With the multiplicative support network around
them, they have less prerogative over personnel matters than American foremen,
while on the other hand they are involved more closely in the production
operation with their team members.
Transfer
The transfer and rotation of workers is viewed by management as an
important vehicle to facilitate both structural adjustment of the organization
and on-the-job training of employees. Taking advantage of broad job
classifications, as discussed earlier, Japanese companies can use transfer
policies effectively. One non-union company has transferred workers rather
extensively to meet changes in their production structure in the course of
their rapid growth, but scheduled transfers for the purpose of career
development have been limited only to some supervisory workers. Another
non-union company has a well-organized system of job rotation for training
purposes. However, rotation seems to have been confined so far within a
relatively limited scope such as within a team. All companies have the system
for voluntary transfer requests by workers. While flexible transfer and
rotation systems are viewed as useful instruments both for the purposes of
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enhancing organization flexibility and of multi-skilling of the workforce,
Japanese plants in the U.S. so far do not seem to have taken full advantage of
this approach.
(4) Industrial Relations
Patterns of industrial relations differ widely among different Japanese
plants in the United States. The variance is particularly impressive in the
question of unionization. One joint venture company has been fully unionized
since its initiation. Another joint venture company, which started
construction of their plant recently, seems to anticipate unionization
although their official attitude toward this question is neutral. One
Japanese company, which is now almost completing construction of their plant
in Detroit, appears to anticipate that their plant will be unionized. On the
other hand, two other Japanese companies which have been operating in the U.S.
for some years have stayed away from unions.
Unionization
The joint venture company, which is fully unionized, started its operation
by recruiting workers largely from the pool of laid-off UAW members from the
old shutdown plant it was taking over. Soon after the initiation of the
operation, an election was called to recognize the union. Indeed, the
ex-union officers of the old local worked closely together with the management
from the formative stage of the new company, particularly in the process of
recruiting workers. The Japanese mother company, following this experience of
the unionized joint venture, has recently launched construction of a major
plant in a Southern rural community, and maintains an official position of
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neutrality toward unionization. The other joint venture company, which has
started construction of its plant in Detroit, has expressed its clear interest
in fostering cooperative and productive industrial relations with UAW. The
regional office of UAW is providing advice and assistance in their recruitment
and training activities. In contrast, one company, which has been operating
successfully for the past several years, has remained ununionized in spite of
recent UAW organizing drives. The other non-unionized company has chosen a
location in a rural community in a Southern right-to-work state, where
anti-union sentiment allegedly prevails.
Corporate Attitude Toward Unions
Varied as they are, attitudes of Japanese companies toward unionization is
hardly generalizable. Their official and formal attitude is unquestionably
neutral. Whether their plants will be unionized, however, seems to depend on
the mixture of several factors, such as their relationship with the partner
American corporations, the philosophy or attitude of those local managers who
have been delegated decision making authority, the location of the plant, the
degree of unionization of the local labor market, the attitude of the
community toward unions, the values and interest of incumbent workers, and the
actual or potential relationship of the companies with regional and national
union leaders.
In the Japanese production system, as discussed earlier, unions are
supposed to, and actually do, play an integral role as a cooperative partner
in production operations, if not in the distributive aspect of industrial
relations. Apparently, the minimum common interest of Japanese companies is
to build cooperative and productive industrial relations with unions by which
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they can recoup the benefits of the Japanese production system. Whether
unionization will become a common mode or not in Japanese plants in the U.S.
in the long run would seem to depend critically on how much both management
and union leaders will learn from and understand the meaning of their recent
and future experiences.
Communication and Information Sharing
An outstanding feature of industrial relations, which all the Japanese
managements equally stress, regardless of whether or not their plants are
unionized, is communication and information sharing. In a unionized plant,
this goal is pursued officially by joint consultations between management and
union representatives at various organizational levels. However, niore
important are unofficial or informal consultations at the workshops. Problem
solving is emphasized strongly through informal communications, consultations,
and discussions at workshops. Grievances are rarely filed, because both
workers and supervisors try to solve problems before they are formalized as
grievances, unlike the conventional grievance handling procedure in American
plants in which problems are first filed as grievances in order to register
them formally. While a collective bargaining agreement contains a formal
procedure for the joint consultation process, it is seldom resorted to, for
the same reason.
Communications and information sharing through formal and informal means
are also strongly stressed in non-unionized plants. Various forms of meetings
and small group activities are utilized as relatively formalized devices of
communication. However, here also, informal discussions and consultations at
the workshop for the purpose of problem solving seem to play a more
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substantial role in day-to-day operations. What is emphasized commonly and
strongly in all the Japanese plants is "listening" by supervisors to opinions,
complaints, suggestions or any other forms of appeals by workers in the shop.
The degree to which a relatively formalized form of small group activities
such QC circles prevails varies among plants, and it largely remains at the
early stage of development.
Attitudes of U.S. workers appears to be quite receptive, at this stage, to
Japanese management policies for human resource management and industrial
relations, and in some instances they are noticeably enthusiastic about them.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In lieu of conclusion, let us probe and discuss further some of the
implications derived from our foregoing observations. We select the following
three points: nature of technology transfer, long-run issues and the
prospects for the Japanese auto industry in the U.S., and lessons for the U.S.
auto industry.
(1) The nature of technological transfer
Our review of the experiences of Japanese plants i the U.S. suggests some
interesting tendencies associated with the nature of technological transfer.
Needless to say, we mean by technological transfer a broad and more meaningful
concept of technology (which includes the role of human resources) than the
conventional usage of the term.
To express in brief, the transfer of hardware technology involves
transplanting it completely as it is, while, in the sphere of humanware
technology, much more diversification and adaptation to local conditions are
necessary.
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The fact that direct and exact transfer can be made in the area of
hardware technology, however, does not mean much in terms of substantial
achievement of the transfer because machines will not operate by themselves.
At this stage, it is hard to conclude whether the self-generating innovative
nature of Japanese humanware technology has been successfully transplanted.
If this property of humanware is not successfully transplanted, the merit of
the Japanese production system will not be recouped in the long run. It is
interesting to note the fact here that labor unions have continuously played
an integral role in supporting effective operation of this system in Japan.
What lessons both Japanese management and American unions can and will learn
in the sphere of industrial relations will have significant implications for
the future development of this transfer.
(2) Long-run issues and prospects
Currently, some of the Japanese plants operating in the United States may
be benefiting from what might be called "start-up effect," whereby American
workers as well as managers are excited about their new experiments.
Moreover, in some instances, workers are satisfied just by the employment
opportunities provided by the Japanese plants. When this excitement
evaporates as the newness and short-run start-up effect phases out, more
substantial problems associated with the humanware, particularly in the
aspects of human resource management and industrial relations, may emerge.
For example, the Japanese approach to wage administration and promotion has
not yet been implemented in the American context. Will this pose problems for
the successful transfer of humanware?
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Still more fundamentally, there are several basic questions which Japanese
corporations must face in the long-run. For instance, how will they fare
competitively with American auto makers over time? This will affect not only
their future growth and profits but also employment opportunities for workers
and business opportunities for parts suppliers. How will they develop a model
or models which will work in the long run in social, economic and cultural
contexts of American industrial society? The successful development of the
Japanese auto industry in Japan has been promoted and supported by a
well-integrated complex of hardware and production management technology,
human resource management, industrial relations, and inter-firm organizational
arrangement as well as other factors. how successfully can Japanese investors
transplant critical elements of such a highly integrated production system and
still acquire the necessary understanding and participation of American
workers, managers, suppliers and dealers? How will they deal with American
unions in the long run? These represent only some of the essential questions
that Japanese investors will have to face and solve if they really wish to
obtain acceptance in American industrial society in the long run.
(3) Lessons for American industry
With the growing presence in the United States of apanese companies using
the Japanese methods of production in large-scale operations and employing
American workers and managers, the opportunities for learning lessons and
transferring their experiences have now become real and plentiful.
The interest of American industry in Japanese systems of management and
production seems to be concentrated more in the area of social organization
than anything else. In fact, a number of innovative attempts pursued in
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American plants, inspired partly by Japanese experience, emphasize team work,
worker's responsibility and participation, and labor-management cooperation.
Japanese managers do emphasize these practices and values as well.
However, it is important to note that Japanese management stresses the human
aspect not because they are Confucianists or humanists, but rather because the
survival of their production system depends critically upon the effectiveness
of human resources for technological reasons. It is for this technological
reason that Japanese management spends enormous resources in its effort to
educate and train human resources. It is for this same reason that Japanese
managements commit themselves strongly to the workers rather than the other
way around, because the human resources fostered within the company are an
indispensable asset. This critical interdependence between production
technology and human resources naturally create profound implications for
their industrial relations as well. Whether or not American management,
unions and workers will learn these lessons (ana if so, what kind of lessons)
from Japanese humanware technology could affect their future course of
development significantly.
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